Explain measured boot versus secure boot and how a TA verifies boot integrity.

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Multiple Choice

Explain measured boot versus secure boot and how a TA verifies boot integrity.

Explanation:
Boot integrity relies on two complementary ideas: secure boot and measured boot. Secure boot blocks untrusted code by verifying the digital signatures of firmware and bootloaders against a trusted root key, forming a trusted start to the system. Measured boot goes further by recording a sequence of measurements—hashes of each loading component—during the boot process and storing them in a tamper-evident way (typically in a TPM’s PCRs). After boot, the Trusted Agent uses those measurements to perform post-boot attestation, checking that the recorded values match known-good baselines and, if needed, presenting an attestation report to a verifier to prove the boot was intact. This combination lets the TA assess boot integrity with verifiable evidence. The other options don’t fit: one misstates that measured boot stores cryptographic keys; another implies measured boot itself blocks untrusted code; another claims the TA uses only local attestation, whereas remote attestation is also commonly used to prove integrity to external parties.

Boot integrity relies on two complementary ideas: secure boot and measured boot. Secure boot blocks untrusted code by verifying the digital signatures of firmware and bootloaders against a trusted root key, forming a trusted start to the system. Measured boot goes further by recording a sequence of measurements—hashes of each loading component—during the boot process and storing them in a tamper-evident way (typically in a TPM’s PCRs). After boot, the Trusted Agent uses those measurements to perform post-boot attestation, checking that the recorded values match known-good baselines and, if needed, presenting an attestation report to a verifier to prove the boot was intact. This combination lets the TA assess boot integrity with verifiable evidence.

The other options don’t fit: one misstates that measured boot stores cryptographic keys; another implies measured boot itself blocks untrusted code; another claims the TA uses only local attestation, whereas remote attestation is also commonly used to prove integrity to external parties.

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